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THE IMPACT OF NON-FARM INCOME ON THE INVESTMENT IN 
AGRICULTURE: EVIDENCE FROM HUNGARY AND SLOVENIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article investigates the impact of non-farm income on the investment for Hungarian and 
Slovenian farms using FADN panel data for the years 2004-2008 and different econometric 
estimation approaches. We find that non-farm income is more important for Slovenian farms 
than for Hungarian farms. Farm gross investment is positively associated  with real sales 
growth and cash flow implying the absence of soft budget constraint. Gross farm investment 
is  negatively  associated with non-farm income, but positively associated with investment 
subsidies. Specific results by country are found depending on growing vs. declining real sales 
and on farm indebtedness. 
KEYWORDS: non-farm income, farm investment, soft budget constraint, panel data analysis 
JEL classification: D81, D92, O12, Q12, C23 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a wealth of literature on the presence of capital market imperfections and their effects 
on firm investment in transition countries (e.g. Budina et al., 2000; Konings et al., 2003; Lizal 
and Svejnar, 2002; Rizov, 2004), and a few papers focusing on this issue for the agricultural 
sector in these countries (Petrick, 2004; Latruffe, 2005; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2007; Bakucs et 
al., 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). This  research provided evidence for existence of capital 
market imperfections during transition and after accession to the European Union (EU). In 
addition, some studies tested the persistence of soft budget constraint in transition economies. 
If soft budget constraint is still persistent that may lead to a postponed restructuring (Kornai, 
2001  and 2003). Soft budget constraint may be more important in agriculture because 
government supports to the farm sector are much higher than to  firms in manufacturing. 
Cross-country comparison of investment behaviour is limited in the agricultural economics 
literature (except Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). Previous empirical analyses on investment 
activity in agriculture are mainly  based on the  augmented accelerator model or Euler 
equations. 
The aim of this current paper is to analyse the existence of soft budget constraint and the role 
of non-farm income on credit market imperfections in two different countries, Hungary and 
Slovenia, using the augmented accelerator model with dynamic panel estimations. Although 
credit market imperfections may play an important role in farm investment in these countries, 
a rare research focuses on the effects of non-farm income on farm investment in transition 
countries. The link between non-farm income and farm investment has been largely 
documented for developing countries. Previous research emphasised that the role of non-farm 
income may be in two opposite direction. On the one hand, non-farm income provides 
additional resources that help farmers overcome their financial constraints, and enable them to 
invest or expand their farm business (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Reardon et al., 1994; 
Reardon, 1997; Deininger and Olinto, 2001). On the other hand, there may be a competition 
between on-farm activities and off-farm activities, in terms of labour or resources 
(Christensen, 1989; Ahituv and Kimhi, 2002; Holden et al., 2004). In this case, a greater 
degree of pluriactivity, that is to say a higher non-farm income, may reduce the incentives to 
produce and to invest on farm. Only one paper, by Hertz (2009), has investigated the role of 
non-farm income in farm investment in transition countries, namely in Bulgaria in 2003. The   743 
author finds support for the first proposition, namely that non-farm income increases 
investment by relaxing capital market imperfections. 
In this paper we aim to clarify whether non-farm income has an effect on farm investment in 
countries that have recently exited the transition phase and are now part of the EU. Moreover, 
our comparative analysis includes two countries with different historical-institutional 
developments and different farm structures: small-scale farms in Slovenia and large-scale 
farms in Hungary. During the communist system Hungarian agriculture was collectivised and 
the average farm size has been all the time among the largest in Europe. In Slovenia the 
collectivisation failed and small-scale farm structure has remained among the smallest in 
Europe. During transition farm structures have developed under emerging market conditions 
and policy changes. Our analysis is based on data from the Hungarian and Slovenian Farm 
Accountancy Data Networks (FADN) during the period 2004-2008. Previous research has 
provided evidence of capital market imperfections in these countries during transition (Bojnec 
and Latruffe, 2007; Bakucs et al., 2009). Our paper will highlight whether such imperfections 
persist after accession to the EU. In addition, we will explore whether non-farm income 
influence farmers’ investment decisions.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
The starting point of our empirical analysis is the standard augmented accelerator model in 
























  (1) 
where subscript i denotes the i-th farm and subscript t denotes the t-th period, while ε is 
stochastic element. Iit denotes gross investment of the i-th farm between periods t and t-1, 
which is calculated as the change in capital stock (net investment) plus depreciation in values; 
values in period t were deflated by the agricultural input price index for goods and services 
contributing to agricultural investment with the base year 2004. Kit-1 is the stock of capital, 
measured by all tangible assets, in the period t-1; values in the current period t are deflated by 
the agricultural input price index with the base year 2004. Qit is the change in output sales 
value between periods t and t-1; values in period t were deflated by the harmonized indices of 
consumer prices with the base year 2004. CFit-1 denotes the real cash flow of the i-th farm, 
defined as before tax profits plus depreciation; values in period  t  were deflated by the 
harmonized indices of consumer prices with the base year 2004. Dependent and explanatory 
variables are normalised by the stock of capital to control for size effects. 
The positive regression coefficient α2 on cash-flow variable is generally interpreted as a sign 
for credit rationing to test the soft budget constraint, as firstly proposed by Fazzari et al. 
(1988). Lizal and Svejnar (2002) proposed two interpretations of the soft budget constraint: 
first, the weak version when the coefficient α2  is zero; firms have access to credit for 
investment irrespective of their profitability. Second, the strong version of the soft budget 
constraint, when the coefficient α2 is negative; firms with poor financial performance can 
access bank loans more easily. 
Following Konings et al. (2003) we estimate equation (1) in first differences to control for 























  (2)   744 
In the estimated econometric models the baseline model is the standard augmented accelerator 
model (equation (2)). We then extend our model specification to include in the explanatory 
variables non-farm income at period t-1 (related to capital to control for size effects). We also 
include investment subsidies to capital as an additional explanatory variable in a separate 
model.  
In addition to full sample estimate, we use farm characteristics to classify farms by increasing 
vs. decreasing real sales, and by high debt and low debt farms (similar as Benjamin and 
Phimister, 2002, we define high debt and low debt farms with debt-to-asset ratio greater than 
0.3 and less than 0.2, respectively) to test the sensitivity of our estimation. We also imposed 
outlier rules by removing farms from econometric estimates if the investment capital ratio is 
above 99% in absolute value (Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). 
In the empirical analysis we use three econometric estimators. First, we employ standard 
static panel models using Hausman test to identify whether random or fixed effect model is 
appropriate. Second, we employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), also referred to as 
GMM-system estimator. Windmeijer (2005) proposes a finite sample correction that provides 
more accurate estimates of the variance of the two-step GMM estimator. As the t-tests based 
on these corrected standard errors are found to be more reliable, the paper estimates the 
coefficients using the finite sample correction. Finally, we have an unbalanced panel dataset 
for the period between 2004 and 2008, thus to correct the unbalanced nature of our data we 




. The author defines a selection indicator rit such that rit =1 if (yit, xit) is 
observed and rit =0 otherwise. From this the dynamic selection rule s (rit, ri,t-1) is created, that 
selects only the observations that are usable for the dynamic model, namely those for which 
both current values and one-time lagged values are observable. As it is good practice to check 
the sensitivity of empirical results, we will present and compare the results from the fixed 
effects estimator, GMM estimator, and LSDVC estimator. 
The data analysis is based on Hungarian and Slovenian FADN that includes farms above two 
European Size Units (ESUs; one ESU is equivalent to 2,200 euros of gross margin). The time 
span used for analysis is 2004-2008. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the data used. Gross investment in Hungarian 
and  Slovenian  FADN farms has  increased, but varies  by farms. The data  shows 
disinvestments by some farms in Slovenia, but not in Hungary. Real sale growth and cash 
flow also on average increased, but vary by farms from negative to positive values. However, 
summary statistics suggest a positive association between gross investment and real sale 
growth on the one hand, and a positive association between gross investment and cash flow 
on the other. Some farms are without investment subsidy, because they did not invest. Not all 
our analysed farms have non-farm sources of income. The percentage of farms with non-farm 
sources of income in Slovenia is much greater (around 40%) than in Hungary (0.8%). The 
higher percentage of farms with non-farm income in Slovenia is a result of tradition of part-
time farming during the previous system, evolution of farms in rural developments, and a 
greater development of non-farm activities in rural areas in Slovenia than in Hungary. 
                                                 
1 We apply the Stata programme xtlsdvc developed by Bruno (2005b) using Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator.   745 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the whole period 2004-2008 
    Hungary (in euro)  Slovenia (in euro) 
Variable    Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean 
Std. 








8367  0.096  0.220  0  11.633  2237  0.049  0.097  -0.206  1.738 







8367  0.253  0.230  -0.939  8.004  2237  0.096  0.180  -0.360  7.035 










8367  0.014  0.275  -10.784  3.593  2237  0.031  0.182  -1.076  6.973 
Investment subsidy 
in period t-1 to 
capital    8367  0.004  0.029  0  1.080  2237  0.004  0.022  0  0.371 
Non-farm income in 
period t-1 to capital    69  3.284  7.673  0.002  43.538  1350  0.023  0.192  0.001  7.017 
 
We classified farms into sub-samples using five criteria: zero or strictly positive non-farm 
income, high or low debt, high or low farm size, and positive or negative real growth of farm 
sales (Table 2). 
The percentage of farms with non-farm income in Slovenia is much higher than in Hungary. 
As the most striking finding, the Slovenian farms with non-zero non-farm income on average 
have higher net farm income than farms without non-farm income, and vice versa in Hungary. 
This finding implies that farm pluriactivity with non-farm supplementary activities and off-
farm employment and incomes in Slovenia is an important source of higher farm households’ 
net income, while Hungarian farms aims to achieve higher incomes through  agricultural 
activities and farm specialization. Farms in Hungary and Slovenia are eligible for different 
kind of subsidies, which in Slovenia are higher on farms with non-farm incomes, and vice 
versa in Hungary. However, in Hungary and in Slovenia subsidies on investment are higher 
on farms without non-farm incomes. This is also consistent with gross investment, which is 
higher on farms without non-farm incomes. Farms combine different sources for their 
investment, including subsidies on investment. 
The large majority of Slovenian farms are classified as non high debt farms (88.9%). This 
percentage for the  Hungarian sample of farms is 20.1%. High debts are associated with 
investments. In Slovenia, the high debt farms invest 3.1 times more, while in Hungary 4.6 
times more, than non high debt farms. The high debt farms are also at least twice as great as 
non high debt farms by each of the presented summary statistics (farm net income and total 
subsidies). 
A slightly higher percentage represents farms, which are classified as non low debt farms: 
2.9% in Slovenia and 32.8% in Hungary. They represent an extended sample of high debt 
farms, which is associated also with their investment activities. In Slovenia, the non low debt 
farms invest 3.2 times, while in Hungary 5.2 times more than the low debt farms. Non low 
debts farms have also more than twice as high net farm income as low debt farms. The former 
also receive much more subsidies than the latter. 
Regarding to the size of farms, in Slovenia the larger farms invested four times more and have 
also more than four times higher net farm income and received twice as much as subsidies 
than smaller ones.  In Hungary larger farms have more than twice times higher net farm 
income, subsidies and investments than smaller ones.   746 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by sub-samples 
  Hungary  Slovenia 











Net farm income  84475.77  48855.52  24549.02  29909.14 
Total subsidies – excluding those on investment  12180.78  5232.087  10030.27  11898.76 
Subsidies on investment  940.4731  599.4203  3460.836  1731.359 
Gross investment  16613.75  7515.696  17443.38  16486.7 
N  9663  69  2008  1350 
 
farms with non 
high debt 
farms with high 
debt 




Net farm income  64775.2  161587.6  26403.92  53631.31 
Total subsidies - excluding those on investment  8117.496  28099.31  10668.61  20909.6 
Subsidies on investment  590.8386  2319.284  2666.05  11655.28 
Gross investment  9657.73  43963.71  16674.02  51592.55 
N  7777  1955  3262  37 
 
farms with non 
low debt 
farms with low 
debt 




Net farm income  145648.3  54187.34  59364.33  25742.73 
Total subsidies - excluding those on investment  24785.14  5944.097  27857.83  10278.9 
Subsidies on investment  1999.338  419.1045  9965.093  2553.662 
Gross investment  36127.03  6976.017  51181.5  16054.54 










Net farm income  92337.26  142097.4  9920.242  43487.6 
Total subsidies - excluding those on investment  29252.66  44490.58  5944.384  15618.51 
Subsidies on investment  2239.15  3494.228  889.9946  4641.091 
Gross investment  37719.16  62188.61  6775.955  27341.58 










Net farm income  98690.27  207913.4  13562.43  53570.7 
Total subsidies - excluding those on investment  31196.5  64653.12  6659.162  19209.15 
Subsidies on investment  2296.463  5655.13  1305.169  5751.167 
Gross investment  40868.95  94428.38  8332.648  34898.66 














Net farm income  103664.8  125704.5  19969.87  29559.75 
Total subsidies - excluding those on investment  35502.87  37759.3  10365.47  10957.86 
Subsidies on investment  4359.25  1952.111  1596.005  3261.53 
Gross investment  56814.23  45806.03  13728.25  18471.2 
N  3707  6025  1000  2358 
N: number of observations. Farm size is measured by land area. We define high debt and low debt farms with 
debt-to-asset ratio greater than 0.3 and less than 0.2, respectively. 
 
These summary statistics clearly indicate the similarities and differences in the financial and 
investment  structures of the Slovenian and Hungarian farms.  Gross farm investment is 
associated to net farm income and subsidies on investment. Non-farm income is much more 
important in Slovenian than in Hungarian farms.   747 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
The standard augmented accelerator model confirms a positive association between farm 
investment and real sale growth and cash flow variables, respectively (Table 3). Therefore, 
our econometric results reject the validity of the soft budget constraint for Hungarian and 
Slovenian farms. However, they reveal the presence of capital market imperfections for both 
samples. The farm investments are negatively associated with non-farm income. This supports 
the second hypothesis suggested in the literature, namely a competition between farm and 
non-farm activities. However, in this case for Hungary the regression coefficient for real sales 
become insignificant, while the regression coefficient for cash flow variable changes the sign. 
On the contrary, in the case of Slovenia, the positive association for cash flow variable 
strengthened in importance. This suggests that in Hungary non-farm income reduces 
incentives for farm investments while in Slovenia real farm sales and real cash flows remain 
significant for farm investments. Farm investments are positively associated with investment 
subsidies in Slovenia, but not in Hungary. 
We use real sales as a farm characteristic to classify farms into two sub-samples: farms with 
increasing real sales (growing farms) vs. farms with declining real sales (shrinking farms). 
The positive association between farm investment and real sale growth remains valid in all 
cases for the growing farms with increasing real sales. In the standard augmented accelerator 
model for Hungary, the regression coefficient for real sale growth becomes insignificant and 
close to zero, while for Slovenia it becomes negative and insignificant also in all other cases 
for farms with the declining real sales. Except for Hungary with non-farm income model 
specifications, the regression coefficient for cash flow variable remains more stable with the 
positive significant sign. This implies an absence of soft budget constraints but the presence 
of capital market imperfections.  Interestingly, the regression coefficients  for investment 
subsidies are positive and significant for both farms with increasing and farms with declining 
real sales in Hungary and Slovenia. The regression coefficients for the association between 
farm investment and non-farm income are mixed. For Hungary, they are of the negative sign 
and significant, but with the insignificant negative sign for the cash flow variable. For 
Slovenia, the regression coefficients for the non-farm income are positive, but insignificant 
for farms with declining real sales and significant for farms with increasing real sales. This 
finding confirms the significance of non-farm incomes, in addition to real sales and cash flow, 
for the growing Slovenian farms in terms of growth in real sales.   748 
Table 3. Fixed effect model results for the full sample and for sub-samples depending on increasing vs. decreasing real sales 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including non-farm 
income at t-1 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including non-farm 
income at t-1 
  Full sample  Full sample  Full sample  Full sample 
Farms with  
negative  
sale growth 
Farms with  
positive  
sale growth 
Farms with  
negative  
sale growth 
Farms with  
positive  
sale growth 
Farms with  
negative sale  
growth 
Farms with  
positive sale  
growth 
HUNGARY                     
Sale growth t,t-1  0.126***  0.147***  0.171  0.125***  0.003  0.209***  0.124***  0.197***  0.496*  0.237*** 
Cash flow t-1  0.085***  0.079***  -0.039***  0.081***  0.044**  0.076***  0.046**  0.071***  -0.245  -0.085 
Investment subsidy    2.543***    -0.173**      2.068***  3.026***     
Non-farm income      -0.004**            -0.007**  -0.003** 
Constant  0.056***  0.042***  0.038  0.058***  0.085***  0.028***  0.052***  0.024***    0.046 
N  5911  5911  54  5911  2737  3174  2737  3174  28  26 
R
2  0.0015  0.1134  0.2496  0.0011  0.0031  0.0070  0.1888  0.0728  0.2246  0.2445 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000             
SLOVENIA        Invsubsidy t-1  negative sales  positive sales  negative sales  positive sales  negative sales  positive sales 
Sale growth t,t-1  0.314***  0.267***  0.177**  0.327***  -0.081  0.551***  -0.001  0.459***  -0.060  0.766*** 
Cash flow t-1  0.076***  0.081***  0.475***  0.075***  0.675***  0.497***  0.611***  0.485***  0.908***  0.167* 
Investment subsidy    1.450***    0.527**      1.137**  1.493***     
Non-farm income      -0.478***            0.510  1.440* 
Constant  0.022***  0.020***  0.031***  0.019***  0.013  -0.011  0.008  -0.008  -0.019  -0.049** 
N  1407  1407  840  1407  661  746  661  746  396  444 
R
2  0.1192  0.2049  0.0963  0.1306  0.2898  0.1657  0.3138  0.2367  0.4454  0.1716 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000             
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   749 
Following Benjamin and Phimister (2002) we impose outlier rules to exclude farms if their 
investment capital ratio is above 99% in absolute value (Table 4). The regression coefficients 
for real sale growth are of a positive sign and significant in all specified cases. The regression 
coefficient for the cash flow variable remains with the similar sign, but in the case of non-
farm income it becomes insignificant. For Slovenia, the regression coefficients are slightly 
lower. The regression coefficients for investment subsidy are of a similar  sign, but the 
negative sign is insignificant. For Slovenia, it becomes also of a negative sign and 
insignificant. Finally, the regression coefficient for non-farm income remains of a negative 
sign and significant. 
 
Table 4. Fixed effect model results for the full sample without farms for which the investment 
capital ratio is above 99% in absolute value 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including non-farm 
income at t-1 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
HUNGARY         
Sale growth t,t-1  0.101***  0.118***  0.236***  0.101*** 
Cash flow t-1  0.053***  0.050***  -0.111  0.052*** 
Investment subsidy    2.381***    -0.044 
Non-farm income      -0.004***   
Constant  0.057***  0.045***  0.063***  0.058*** 
N  5883  5883  54  5883 
R
2  0.0016  0.1106  0.1935  0.0014 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
SLOVENIA        Invsubsidy t-1 
Sale growth t,t-1  0.339***  0.282***  0.249***  0.337*** 
Cash flow t-1  0.023*  0.030**  0.090***  0.022* 
Investment subsidy    1.231***    -0.292 
Non-farm income      -0.099***   
Constant  0.018***  0.018***  0.025***  0.019*** 
N  1403  1403  837  1403 
R
2  0.1316  0.2221  0.0967  0.1279 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by capital. N: number 
of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Moreover, we split our FADN sample into two sub-samples depending on farm indebtedness 
to classify farms as high debt vs. low debt farms that can be considered to differ in their 
financial constraints. Similar as Benjamin and Phimister (2002) we define high debt and low 
debt farms with debt-to-asset ratio greater than 0.3 and less than 0.2, respectively. 
Gross farm investment is  positively associated with real sale  growth, but the regression 
coefficients are insignificant for Slovenian high debt farms as well as for Hungarian high debt 
farms in the case of the standard augmented accelerator model, with investment subsidies and 
when estimated by OLS (Table 5). The regression coefficients for the cash flow variables, 
except for Hungary when estimated by OLS and for Slovenia for high debt farms estimated by 
OLS, are of a positive sign and significant. The regression coefficients for the investment 
subsidy variable are mixed. For Hungary they are of a positive sign and significant, except 
when  lagged  investment subsidy variable is used. For Slovenia, for high debt farms the 
regression coefficients are insignificant, while for low debt farms they are significant, but of 
the opposite signs: a positive sign for investment subsidy and a negative sign for lagged 
investment subsidy. The regression coefficients for non-farm income are of a negative sign, 
but significant only for high debt farms for Hungary and low debt farms in Slovenia.   750 
Table 5. Fixed effect model results for the sub-samples depending on indebtedness 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
Including non-farm 


















HUNGARY                 
Sale growth t,t-1  0.073  0.160***  0.100**  0.172***  0.074  0.160***  -0.202  0.186 
Cash flow t-1  0.097***  0.169***  0.102***  0.162***  0.102***  0.172***  -0.028  -0.106 
Investment subsidy      2.774***  2.258***  0.181  0.085     
Non-farm income              -0.006*  -0.001 
Constant  0.101***  0.033***  0.078***  0.024***  0.100***  0.032***  0.297***  0.039 
N  1214  3939  1214  3939  1214  3939  11  36 
R
2  0.0065  0.0085  0.0637  0.0876  0.0056  0.0090  0.4121  0.0445 
SLOVENIA                 
Sale growth t,t-1  0.271  0.337***  0.982  0.325***  0.288  0.335***  0.364  0.212*** 
Cash flow t-1  1.128***  0.023*  1.091**  0.031***  1.120***  0.023*  2.062  0.105*** 
Investment subsidy      -2.061  1.135***  0.331  -0.470**     
Non-farm income              -3.440  -0.115*** 
Constant  0.041  0.018***  -0.074  0.014***  0.036  0.020***  0.028  0.027*** 
N  20  1361  20  1361  20  1361  16  808 
R
2  0.3203  0.1211  0.3734  0.2189  0.3225  0.1125  0.1027  0.0684 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   751 
The re-estimated  adapted standard augmented models by the dynamic panel data model 
(GMM-SYS) confirm the positive and significant association between farm gross investment 
and farm real sale growth (Table 6). Farm gross investment is positively associated with cash 
flow, but the regression coefficients in the standard augmented accelerator model as well as 
with the additional investment subsidy variable are insignificant for Slovenia. Farm gross 
investment is found to be positively and significantly associated with investment subsidies 
both for Hungary and Slovenia. The negative and significant association between gross farm 
investment and non-farm income is confirmed only for Slovenia. These results reject the 
validity of the soft budget constraints for Hungarian farms and to a lesser extent for Slovenian 
farms, and confirm the presence of capital market imperfections and the competition between 
farm and non-farm activities. 
 
Table 6. Dynamic Panel Model (GMM-SYS) results for the full sample 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including non-farm 
income at t-1 
HUNGARY       
Sale growth t,t-1  0.233***  0.227***   
Cash flow t-1  0.529***  0.457***   
Investment subsidy    2.954***   
Non-farm income       
Constant  -0.027*  -0.030**   
N  5911  5911   
Wald test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000   
Sargan test (p-value)  0.5729  0.1741   
Arellano-Bond test for Ar(2) (p-value)  0.7925  0.2325   
SLOVENIA       
Sale growth t,t-1  0.320***  0.252**  0.211* 
Cash flow t-1  0.074  0.054  0.601*** 
Investment subsidy    0.946***   
Non-farm income      -0.613*** 
Constant  0.013  0.018  0.005 
N  1407  1407  840 
Wald test (p–value)  0.0043  0.0004  0.0000 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.0250  0.0197  0.1620 
Arellano-Bond test for Ar(2) (p-value)  0.0152  0.0116  0.2753 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by capital. N: number 
of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
The sample selection models based on the bootstrapped standard errors estimates provide all 
significant regression parameters at 1% significance level (Table 7). The positive association 
between gross farm investment and real sale growth is confirmed. Farms in both countries 
based their investment decisions on market conditions. The positive association between gross 
farm investment and cash flow also rejects the validity of the soft budget constraints but 
confirms the presence of capital market imperfections. Finally, the results for Slovenia 
indicate that investment subsidies are positively associated with gross farm investment, while 
non-farm income is negatively associated with gross farm investment. Therefore, we cannot 
confirm that non-farm income in the Slovenian farms is invested into farm activities, but they 
are likely to contribute to the well-being of farm households’ members. 
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Table 7. LSDVC sample selection models results for the full sample 
  Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including non-farm 
income at t-1 
HUNGARY       
Sale growth t,t-1  0.154***  0.175***   
Cash flow t-1  0.228***  0.233***   
Investment subsidy    2.656***   
Non-farm income       
N  5883  5883   
SLOVENIA       
Sale growth t,t-1  0.314***  0.279***  0.162** 
Cash flow t-1  0.063***  0.065***  0.565*** 
Investment subsidy    1.471***   
Non-farm income      -0.570*** 
N  1407  1407  840 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by capital. N: 
number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
based on bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We use an adapted augmented accelerator model of gross farm investment for a panel data of 
Hungarian and Slovenian farms for the years 2004-2008 to investigate the impact of non-farm 
income on gross farm investment. We use different econometric estimation approaches to test 
the sensitivity and robustness of our econometric results. 
We find different nature of farms in Hungary and Slovenia. Non-farm income is  more 
important for Slovenian than for Hungarian farms, and the Slovenian farms with non-farm 
income on average have higher net farm income than farms without non-farm income, and 
vice versa in Hungary. Similarly investment subsidies in Slovenia are higher on farms with 
non-farm income, and vice versa in Hungary. On average smaller Slovenian farms are of 
more multifunctional activities, while on average larger Hungarian farms are more specialised 
into agricultural activities. 
Both for Hungary and Slovenia subsidies for investments are higher on farms without non-
farm income. Gross farm investment is also higher on farms without non-farm income. Farm 
indebtedness is associated with farm investment. Farm engaged in investment are greater by 
size than farms without investment. Farms combine different sources for their investment, 
including subsidies on investment. 
Farm gross investment is positively associated with real sale growth suggesting that farm 
investment decisions are based on market conditions. The association is also positive with 
cash flow, implying the absence of the soft budget constraints and the presence of capital 
market imperfections limiting investment expenditures. Gross farm investment is negatively 
associated with non-farm income, but a positively associated with investment subsidies. This 
reveals that, in opposite to the majority of findings from studies in developing countries and 
transition countries, non-farm income is not used as a substitute to credit to cover investment 
expenditures in the presence of capital market imperfections. By contrast, our results suggest 
that in the specific period of post-accession to the EU, there is a competition between farm 
and non-farm activities in Hungarian and Slovenian activities. Although public programmes 
to support farm investment (investment subsidies) seem to be successful in enhancing 
investment in these countries, policies should take into account the role of growing off-farm   753 
employment opportunities in farmers’ decisions, as this situation may result in disinvestments 
and slower restructuring in the farming sectors. 
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